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The Eﬀect of Population Aging on 
the Aggregate Labor Market
Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
10.1    Introduction
Economists have long noted the role that population growth plays in eco-
nomic growth and other economic outcomes (e.g., Hagen 1959; Kuznets 
1956, 1958; Becker, Glaeser, and Murphy 1999). Prior to World War II, the 
dominant question was how economies would grapple with declining popu-
lation growth (Hansen 1939; Keynes 1937), as fertility had been declining 
and immigration had slowed. However, that all changed as the end of World 
War II ushered in an unprecedented jump in fertility rates, which Easterlin 
(1961) described as an “abrupt break with historical experience.” In 1946 
the U.S. fertility rate leapt by an astounding 19 percent, and then jumped 
by another 11 percent in 1947, ﬁ  nally peaking in 1957 at 40 percent above 
the World War II levels. This rapid surge in births created an extraordi-
nary population bulge now known as the baby boom. That the baby boom 
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was followed by a fertility trough only reinforced the former’s uniqueness.1 
Indeed, fertility rates began to decline in 1958, and demographers typically 
date the end of the baby boom in 1964. Over the next several years, fertility 
rates fell more sharply. By 1973 they were well below not only the World 
War II rates, but well below any fertility rate since 1909, when the National 
Center for Health Statistics’ published series begins.2
In addition to their large numbers, the baby boomers are expected to 
live longer than the cohorts that preceded them. For example, in 1949, an 
American aged ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve could expect to live another twenty-  one years, on 
average; by 2002, a ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve-  year-  old could expect to live another twenty- 
six years.
In this chapter, we examine the direct implications of the shifting popu-
lation age distribution for several labor market measures: the unemployment 
rate, the participation rate, gross labor force ﬂ  ows, and wage rates. We ﬁ  nd 
that the largest eﬀects on the aggregate labor force participation rate are 
yet to come, while the eﬀects on the unemployment rate have mostly run 
their course. In addition, the movement of the baby boomers into the high- 
earnings age groups has pushed up mean wages and changed the average 
ﬂ  ows though labor market states only modestly.
Because the cohorts both preceding and following the baby boom were 
relatively small, the aging of the baby boomers has had a pronounced 
inﬂ  uence on the population distribution. Figure 10.1 shows the shares of 
selected age groups in the age sixteen and over Civilian Noninstitutional 
Population (CNIP) taken from the Current Population Survey (CPS), 
along with how those population shares are expected to evolve in the years 
ahead, based on Census Bureau projections. The share of older Americans 
has already begun to rise, and this increase is projected to continue until 
around 2030.
Labor market behavior varies substantially over the life cycle. As a result, 
the aging of the U.S. population has aﬀected headline measures of labor 
market activity, sometimes even obscuring more structural changes in the 
economy. Perry (1971) was among the ﬁ  rst to realize that the increase in 
the number of baby boom teenagers in the labor force was confounding 
interesting economic measurement. He was interested in inﬂ  ation, and the 
role the unemployment rate played as a proxy for labor market tightness. 
Increases in the share of teens in the labor force had increased the share 
1. See also Montgomery and Trussell (1986), who provide more detail of the demographic 
changes, not only the fertility increase of the baby boom, but also changes in age at ﬁ  rst mar-
riage, marital status, and other contributing factors that underlay this pattern.
2. Fertility data is available from the National Center for Health Statistics website at 
http:/ / www.cdc.gov/ nchs/ data/ statab/ natﬁ  nal2002.annvol1_01.pdf. Life expectancy tables can 
be found at http:/ / www.cdc.gov/ nchs/ products/ pubs/ pubd/ lftbls/ life/ 1966.htm, for example. In 
1945 in the United States there were 85.9 births per 1,000 women aged ﬁ  fteen to forty-  four. In 
1946 there were 101.9 and in 1947 there were 113.3. In 1957 there were 122.7 births per 1,000 
women aged ﬁ  fteen to forty-  four, but by 1973, the fertility rate had fallen to 68.8.The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    3 7 9
of a demographic group with relatively high unemployment rates. This 
demographic shift alone put upward pressure on the unemployment rate 
during the 1970s, and made using the level of the unemployment rate as a 
proxy for labor market tightness inconsistent over time. Perry constructed a 
demographically adjusted unemployment rate to abstract from this change, 
holding constant ﬁ  xed labor force shares to remove the ﬂ  uctuations in the 
relative share of boomers.3 More recently, Shimer (1998), Abraham and 
Shimer (2001), and Valletta and Hodges (2005) have noted that the declines 
in the shares of teenagers and young adults in the labor force have put 
measurable downward pressure on unemployment rates beginning in the 
late 1980s.
Even more striking are the implications for the labor force participation 
rate. Participation rates rise sharply with age through the early-  to-  mid- 
twenties, and continue to rise through the thirties and forties. Although we 
fondly think of forefathers who worked diligently until death, participation 
has declined sharply with age for most of the nation’s history, and retirement 
has been a feature of life cycle labor supply since at least 1870 (Ransom and 
Sutch 1988).4 Indeed, it has long been recognized that participation rates 
level oﬀ from the mid-  forties through about age ﬁ  fty or ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve, and then 
Fig. 10.1    Population shares (history and projection)
3. See also Summers (1986) and Flaim (1990).
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decline precipitously. As a result, Aaronson et al. (2006) showed that the 
pronounced shift in the population toward older age groups recently began 
to put noticeable downward pressure on the aggregate participation rate. 
This marked the start of what is likely to be a sharp decline in participation 
that will last another half-  century. As a result, in contrast to labor supply 
growth of 2 percent a year for much of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) projects labor supply growth will slow to 0.5 
percent by 2015, and 0.3 percent by 2025.5
If the levels of unemployment and the labor force are sensitive to the age 
distribution, it is natural to ask how the ﬂ  ows across labor force statuses 
are aﬀected. Blanchard and Diamond (1990), for example, note that the 
rates of labor force transitions vary by age. Younger individuals are more 
likely to move from out of the labor force into employment, while prime- age 
males are quite likely to enter unemployment after job loss instead of going 
back to school. However, little research has addressed how the changing 
age distribution has altered aggregate ﬂ  ows over time, and Blanchard and 
Diamond’s sample ends in 1986. We update their observation, and describe 
how the shifting age distribution has changed the evolution of labor market 
ﬂ  ows over time, and how they are likely to evolve going forward as the baby 
boomers age.
Wage rates also vary substantially over the life cycle. Moreover, rela-
tive cohort size may inﬂ  uence earnings. In particular, as the baby boomers 
entered the labor force as lower-  skilled young workers, evidence suggests 
that their sheer numbers depressed their wages, perhaps by as much as 10 
percent (Murphy, Plant, and Welch 1988). We show later that the mere shift-
ing of the baby boomers in and out of high wage age groups has measurably 
altered aggregate mean wages, pushing them up in recent decades.
In addition, a large literature on the implications of aging on the economy 
has focused primarily on the inﬂ  uence of population aging on old age pro-
grams like social security and the related estimates of the dependency ratio 
(e.g., Weil 1997; Borsch- Supan 2003), rather than emphasizing the eﬀects of 
aging on macroeconomic quantities that concern us here. Our contribution 
is to focus more speciﬁ  cally on quantifying or updating estimates of the 
direct eﬀects of the shifting age distribution on some of the major aggregate 
measures of labor market activity, and to project how these measures are 
likely to be inﬂ  uenced in the years ahead.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 10.2 we describe 
the CPS data that we use. In sections 10.3 through 10.6 we consider the 
inﬂ  uence that aging has had on each measure of labor market activity and 
how the continued aging of the population will likely aﬀect it going forward. 
Section 10.7 concludes.
5. See also Toossi (2006).The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    3 8 1
10.2    Data
The oﬃcial statistics on the labor force published by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) come from the Current Population Survey (CPS), a survey of 
roughly 60,000 households conducted monthly by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
We use these published data along with the underlying CPS microdata to 
analyze labor force participation, unemployment, labor market ﬂ  ows, and 
levels of earnings.
The labor force questions are asked of all civilians age sixteen and over. 
Individuals are in the sample for four months, get an eight- month break, and 
are then interviewed for another four months. At the fourth and eighth inter-
view months workers are asked about earnings and hours of work (these 
are the “outgoing rotation groups”), which form the basis of the wage mea-
sures used later. The survey includes data on the labor force status of each 
individual as well as basic demographic information. We have adjusted the 
data for the eﬀects of survey redesigns, revisions to population weights, and 
other inconsistencies that would inﬂ  uence the interpretation of time series 
constructed from the microdata.
The individual observations in the CPS are weighted according to esti-
mates of the population provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. These esti-
mates are real-  time assessments of the size and makeup of the U.S. popu-
lation. The Census Bureau, of course, conducts the decennial census. In 
between the decennial censuses, which serve as benchmarks, the agency 
produces estimates that update how many people are living in the United 
States based on a variety of sources ranging from the National Center for 
Health Statistics to the Department of Defense and incorporating estimates 
from surveys such as the American Community Survey. The Census Bureau 
updates its estimates as new data become available, and at any given time 
represent the nation’s best estimates of the population over history.
Both the Census Bureau and the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
produce population projections broken down by age and gender groups. 
The Census Bureau projections are based on the sizes of birth cohorts, 
assumptions about fertility rates, estimated death rates, and assumptions 
for net international migration, and currently extend out to 2050.6 The SSA 
6. The Census population estimates are updated annually while the Census projections are 
updated about twice a decade. Therefore, the Census projections for population levels may not 
be consistent with the Census’ best current estimate of the historical population. This highlights 
where some projection risks may lie. For example, the age distribution in the population esti-
mates reﬂ  ected in the 2005 CPS population shares imply more downward pressure from aging 
on aggregate labor force participation than does the age distribution in the projections that 
the estimates have superseded. Similarly, revisions to population estimates in January of 2006 
prompted revisions to the weights in the Current Population Survey, from which participation 
is oﬃcially measured. The resulting new population estimates, taken alone, caused the labor 
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produces its own projections that diﬀer primarily in the assumptions for 
net international migration, including undocumented immigration. Both 
agencies project that the population’s age distribution will continue to shift 
markedly toward older age groups. Our analysis following relies on Census 
Bureau projections, but qualitatively there would be little diﬀerence if we 
had used SSA projections.7
10.3      The Labor Force Participation Rate
Of all the major labor market indicators, the labor force participation 
rate is likely to be inﬂ  uenced the most profoundly by the aging of the 
population. Figure 10.2 shows the aggregate participation rate since 1948. 
Broadly speaking, the participation rate over the second half of the twen-
tieth century has had three regimes: a period of relative stability until the 
mid-  1960s, a period of steady increase between the mid-  1960s and the late 
1980s, and another recent period of relative stability. This experience was 
dominated by movements in women’s labor force participation, which rose 
sharply over the twenty- ﬁ  ve years following 1965, and leveled oﬀ after about 
1990. As noted previously, the aging of the population appears already to be 
making itself felt in the decline in participation since about the year 2000, 
which likely marks the beginning of a fourth regime: a period of falling 
participation.
10.3.1      The Aging of the Population
The reason that the aging of the population has the potential to drasti-
cally slow labor supply growth is that labor force participation rates decline 
precipitously after age ﬁ  fty. Thus, as the baby boomers move into their six-
ties and as life expectancies continue to lengthen, the rising proportion of 
older Americans has the potential to lower the share of Americans who are 
working or looking for work. For example, by 2035 the share of the sixteen 
and over population who are aged eighty or above is expected to double to 
approximately 15 percent, and 97 percent of this age group currently do not 
participate in the labor force. The current downward pressure of the age dis-
tribution on participation is primarily because two forces—the aging of the 
baby boomers and longer life expectancies—are now pushing in the same 
direction, after many years in which the upward pressure of baby boomers 
moving into high participation rate ages oﬀset the downward pressure from 
longer life expectancies.
Figure 10.3 shows the age proﬁ  les of labor force participation rates for 
men and women using 2005 annual averages for fourteen age categories, 
and the aggregate participation rate for reference. Among women, the 
7. For more details on the sensitivity of projected labor force estimates to varying assump-
tions concerning undocumented immigration see Fallick and Pingle (2007b).Fig. 10.2    Aggregate labor force participation rate, 1948:Q1–  2006:Q3
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Note: Shaded area is NBER dated recessions.
Fig. 10.3    Labor force participation rates by age and gender (2005)384        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
groups over ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve years of age have below-  average labor force participa-
tion rates. Among men, the age groups over age sixty have below average 
labor force participation rates. In both cases, participation rates begin to 
fall after about age ﬁ  fty. Whether this is due to failing health, disability, 
retirement income, or wealth, it is a feature of life cycle labor supply unlikely 
to change fundamentally in the next few decades. While the slope of the 
age-  participation function may change, it is quite likely to remain strongly 
negative.
The implication for labor force participation is striking. Figure 10.4 shows 
the history of the labor force participation rate through 2006, along with 
a projection that uses the 2005 labor force participation rate for each age 
group and allows the population shares to evolve as projected by the Cen-
sus projections. Although other starting years can produce mildly diﬀerent 
patterns, the implications are essentially the same: absent other changes, 
projected population aging will lower the aggregate labor force participa-
tion rate by 6 full percentage points over the next thirty-  ﬁ  ve years. This 
pace of decline dwarfs the 0.4 percentage point that shifting population 
shares have lowered the aggregate rate over the past four years. In sum, 
the projected aging of the labor force is likely to have a sizeable inﬂ  uence 
on participation, with the potential to completely unwind the increases 
in participation attributable to the earlier entry of more women in the 
workforce.
Fig. 10.4    An accounting of eﬀect of aging on the labor force participation rate
Note: Within-  group participation rates refer to fourteen age groups for men and women.The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    3 8 5
10.3.2      The Aging of Particular Cohorts
There is another aspect of aging that has implications for the aggregate 
labor force participation rate—not changes in the age distribution, but the 
movement of particular cohorts through the age distribution.
Most of the low-  frequency change in the labor force participation rate in 
the second half of the twentieth century came from changes in participa-
tion rates within age groups rather than changes in the age distribution of 
the population. For women, much of this increase in participation appears 
to have resulted from the entry into the working-  age population of birth 
cohorts with higher average participation rates than those who preceded 
them, and the progress of these higher-  participation cohorts through the 
age distribution. As these cohorts have aged, and earlier cohorts have left 
the scene, the population of women has come to be dominated by cohorts 
who have proved to have generally higher participation rates throughout 
their lives. A similar eﬀect seems to have been at work among men, but in 
the opposite direction, as successive cohorts of men have had generally lower 
participation rates than their predecessors.
This evolution of participation rates by cohort likely reﬂ  ects numerous 
factors—such as evolving tastes, reproductive technology, wealth, educa-
tion, social attitudes, retirement, welfare, and ﬁ  nancial systems—some of 
which were internalized into the behavior of new generations more easily 
than into the behavior of mature cohorts who had already made “sticky” 
choices, an idea that goes back at least as far as Durand (1948).
The phenomenon is illustrated in ﬁ  gure 10.5, which shows the labor force 
participation rates for three age groups of women: age thirty-  ﬁ  ve to forty- 
four, age forty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  four, and age ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to sixty-  four. Each line 
shows the participation rate of an age group over time. However, the hori-
zontal axis shows the birth year for the middle age of the group, rather than 
the year of observation. In this way, the lines are shifted so that each birth 
cohort is vertically aligned with itself at diﬀerent ages. The participation rate 
of the forty-  ﬁ  ve-   to ﬁ  fty-  four-  year-  old group (the dashed line) appears to 
exhibit three rough inﬂ  ections, in the vicinity of years 1960, 1975, and 1997. 
These correspond to the cohorts born around 1910, 1925, and 1947. The ﬁ  rst 
two of these inﬂ  ections line up well with the ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ   ve-  to sixty- four- year- old 
group (the dotted line), meaning that the inﬂ  ection points in both age groups 
seem to occur when the cohorts born in 1910 and 1925 passed through 
those age groups. The cohort associated with the third inﬂ  ection (those born 
around 1947) are not quite old enough to exhibit that inﬂ  ection in the older 
group, but it can be seen when that cohort was thirty- ﬁ  ve to forty- four years 
old (the solid line). Similarly (not shown), beginning in the mid-  1960s and 
ending in the late 1970s, successive cohorts of sixteen-   to twenty-  four-  year- 
old women had higher participation rates than their predecessors. Participa-
tion rates of successive cohorts twenty-  ﬁ  ve to thirty-  four years old stopped 386        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
rising about ten years later, in the late 1980s, suggesting that the participation 
rate in each of these age groups at a given time is at least partly related to 
which birth cohort is passing through that age at that time.
Of course, not all inﬂ  ection points in all age groups line up so well by birth 
year; clearly, there have been developments in participation that are not well- 
represented by the aging of birth cohorts. However, the coincidences that 
do exist are suﬃcient to indicate that birth cohort has played a signiﬁ  cant 
role in describing participation rates. Consequently, the aging of particular 
birth cohorts has played an important role in the evolution of the aggregate 
participation rate. In particular, the long increase in the aggregate partici-
pation rate from the early 1970s through the late 1980s can be attributed 
largely to the successively higher participation rates of cohorts born up 
through the beginning of the baby boom. And the end of that long period 
of increase can be attributed to the baby boom cohorts, who have roughly 
similar average participation rates, coming to dominate the population as 
they moved through the age distribution. Looking ahead, the same phenom-
enon of the aging of particular cohorts can be expected to put downward 
pressure on the aggregate participation rate, as successive cohorts of men 
and women appear to have generally lower propensities to participate.
These ideas are developed more fully in Fallick and Pingle (2007a), which 
develops a model of aggregate labor force participation that incorporates 
Fig. 10.5    Participation of women by birth cohort (actual data–  not a projection)The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    3 8 7
both changes in the age distribution of the population and the movement 
of cohorts through the age distribution, as well as exploring other measur-
able factors that appear to inﬂ  uence participation rates. The model relies 
on cohort eﬀects in order to predict the future path of participation for 
individual birth years—essentially using the observed information shown 
in ﬁ  gure 10.5 to form a baseline of relative labor force attachment going 
forward. The authors’ model contains cyclical controls, variables represent-
ing education, fertility, and socioeconomic trends, as well as the features of 
public programs. While we will not explicate that model here, ﬁ  gure 10.6 
shows its implications for the future of the participation rate under one 
reasonable set of assumptions. The combination of the aging of popula-
tion in general, the aging of cohorts in particular, and other factors imply 
a steeply falling participation rate over the next decade or so. In addition, 
although the model appears to ﬁ  t closely the annual averages in 2006 and 
2007, model estimation was stopped in 2005, so the subsequent years are an 
out-  of-  sample projection, and thus not necessarily end-  point bias.
Most relevant to the discussion of aging, however, is that the declines 
projected incorporate the expectation that the baby boomers will have much 
more labor force attachment than prior cohorts (despite not often exhibit-
ing this during their prime working years). As shown in ﬁ  gure 10.7, the 
participation rate of men age sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over is expected to increase as 
the baby boomers enter the age sixty-  ﬁ  ve and older age group, although 
the pace of increases is estimated to slow near 2015. In the Fallick/  Pingle 
model the increases are attributable to a combination of longer life expectan-
Fig. 10.6    Aggregate LFPR projections388        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
cies, higher education among the cohorts reaching these ages, and favorable 
social security incentives (the rising retirement age and the increases in the 
delayed retirement credit).
For women aged sixty-  ﬁ  ve and over, the forecast is for quite robust 
increases in participation as the baby boom cohorts exhibit greater attach-
ment than the average of the preceding cohorts already over age sixty-  ﬁ  ve 
(ﬁ  gure 10.8). The cohort model trend estimates for older women are slightly 
steeper than forecasts produced by government agencies such as BLS and 
SSA, but a little less steep for the forecasts of older men. For the older men, 
the diﬀerence is likely attributable to the fact that baby boomer males, during 
their prime working ages, tended to work less than men of earlier cohorts, 
and our model perhaps carries forward more of these “unobserved prefer-
ences” than the BLS or SSA projections.8 In a similar vein, for the older 
women, the model may carry more of the high degree of attachment of the 
cohorts who raised prime-  age female labor supply from 1970 to 1990 into 
this older age category. If we look at the rough estimates, the projections 
expect gains of nearly 1/ 2 percentage point per year in this group’s participa-
tion rate. The share of age sixty- ﬁ  ve- and- over women is expected to increase 
from 9 percent to 10 percent of the population over this period. Roughly 
speaking, this implies this demographic group alone would add nearly 5 
Fig. 10.7    Male age 65-  plus projections
8. For BLS estimates see Toossi (2006). For a more detailed and thorough discussion and 
decomposition of the diﬀerences in long-  run forecasts see Fallick and Pingle (2007a, 2007b).The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    3 8 9
basis points to the aggregate participation rate per year. The pace of decline 
due to population aging shown in ﬁ  gure 10.5 is roughly 2 percentage points 
per year, on average, between 2005 and 2040. Thus, the projected increase in 
participation among older women would oﬀset roughly 1/  4 of that decline. 
In the end, the shifts in the population age distribution are a relatively power-
ful force for even signiﬁ  cant behavioral changes to overcome.9
10.4    Unemployment  Rate
Looking back over the past forty years, ﬁ  gure 10.9 shows that the move-
ments in the aggregate unemployment rate can be divided into two phases: 
from the mid- 1960s through the early 1980s, the unemployment rate moved 
higher; since then the unemployment rate has shown a pronounced down-
Fig. 10.8    Female age 65-  plus projections
9. The sensitivity of these projections are evaluated in Fallick and Pingle (2007a and 2007b). 
In particular, alternative assumptions for population growth and immigration are evaluated. 
Under even large margins of error in these assumptions, the downward pressure on the par-
ticipation rate from population aging (big boomer cohort followed by smaller cohort behind) 
dominates the other inﬂ  uences. In fact, as shown by the revised participation rate estimates 
published by the BLS in the January 2008 employment situation report, population growth was 
shown to have been overestimated thus far this decade by a substantial amount, and the aging 
of the population underestimated, altogether revising down the labor force participation rate 
by 0.1 percentage point. Although the next decennial census in 2010 will be more revealing, the 
downward pressure of population aging seems likely to be the dominant driver of trend labor 
force participation for the next few decades.390        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
trend. These movements reﬂ  ect more than business cycle ﬂ  uctuations. The 
lowest unemployment rate achieved at the cyclical peaks and the highest 
unemployment rate hit at the cyclical troughs both ratcheted up from the 
1960s through the early 1980s. Subsequently, both cyclical high and low 
unemployment rates have declined consistently, with the unemployment rate 
bottoming out in 2000 at its lowest level since 1969.
The apparent trends in the unemployment rate have not been associated 
with changes in inﬂ  ationary pressures. On the contrary, core price inﬂ  ation 
moved higher through the 1970s, and has trended downward since. This 
suggests that at least some of the low frequency movements in the aggregate 
unemployment rate have reﬂ  ected changes in the structural or natural rate of 
unemployment. In this section, we examine several factors that help explain 
these low frequency movements. To preview, we show that shifting labor 
force shares related to the age distribution of the population can explain a 
good deal of both the earlier rise and subsequent decline in the aggregate 
unemployment rate. However, even after accounting for the eﬀects of chang-
ing labor force shares, signiﬁ  cant movements in the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate remain unexplained by these “between” group factors.
10.4.1      The Age Distribution of the Population
The most obvious way in which the aging of the population aﬀects the 
aggregate unemployment rate is simply that some age groups tend to have 
higher unemployment rates than others. Figure 10.10 shows the average 
Fig. 10.9    Aggregate U.S. unemployment rate, 1967–  2006The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    3 9 1
unemployment rates in 1997 for men and women in various age groups. The 
variation in unemployment rates across age is substantial but is concentrated 
among the younger age groups. In particular, unemployment rates fall from 
the sixteen to seventeen group to the twenty- ﬁ  ve to twenty- nine group, then 
are pretty stable from age thirty on. Thus, as population shares change, the 
aggregate unemployment rate can be expected to change.
For many years it has been a common practice to adjust the unemploy-
ment rate for such changes in the age/  sex composition of the labor force. 
The usual method is to recalculate the unemployment rate by weighting the 
unemployment rates of the various demographic groups by their labor force 
shares in some base year (Perry 1971) rather than allowing those shares to 
change over time.
Here we follow this practice with a couple of variations. First, most 
demographic adjustments to the unemployment rate are performed using 
fairly broad age groups, which may miss some subtleties in the evolution 
of the unemployment rate; we use fourteen age groups. Second, we are 
interested in decomposing changes in the demographic shares of the labor 
force into the two components of changes in population shares and changes 
in relative participation rates. Therefore, to compute the contribution to 
changes in the unemployment rate of the aging of the population alone, 
we hold group-  speciﬁ  c labor force participation rates and group-  speciﬁ  c 
unemployment rates constant at their 1997 average levels, and apply those 
rates to changing population shares to yield a counterfactual aggregate 
Fig. 10.10    Unemployment rates by age and sex (1997)392        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
unemployment rate. The diﬀerence between this counterfactual unemploy-
ment rate and the actual unemployment rate in 1997 provides one mea-
sure of the direct inﬂ  uence of changes in the age distribution of the popu-
lation on the aggregate unemployment rate. This diﬀerence is shown in 
ﬁ  gure 10.11.
Because the diﬀerences in unemployment rates across age groups are 
concentrated at younger ages (under thirty), the changing age distribu-
tion of the population had its most notable accounting inﬂ  uence on the 
aggregate unemployment rate from the 1960s through the 1980s, when 
the baby boomers were moving through these younger ages. In contrast, 
the inﬂ  uence of shifts in the age distribution on the unemployment rate 
over the past decade has been small, as the baby boom moved through 
ages with fairly similar unemployment rates. From 1967 to 1976, the 
aging of the population pushed the unemployment rate up through this 
channel by 0.2 percentage point; since 1976, this channel has reduced 
the unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage point, but only 0.2 percentage 
point of this decline has come since 1991. As the population continues to 
age in coming years, we can expect this downward pressure on the unem-
ployment rate to increase somewhat, but not to the degree that we saw 
in the 1980s.
Fig.  10.11  Eﬀect of changing population shares on the aggregate unemployment 
rate (relative to 1997 actual unemployment rate)
Note: Diﬀerence between reweighted 1997 age-  sex speciﬁ  c unemployment rates (weights are 
age- sex  speciﬁ  c population shares times the 1997 labor force participation rates) and the 1997 
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10.4.2      The Age Distribution of the Labor Force
There is, however, another way in which the aging of the population can 
be thought of as inﬂ  uencing the unemployment rate. Beyond changing the 
age distribution of the population, over time diﬀerent cohorts of people 
come to dominate the labor market. As previously noted, and in previous 
work, we argued that as newer cohorts came to replace older cohorts in 
particular age groups, the labor force participation rates of those age groups 
changed. This is not the only source of changes in age-  speciﬁ  c participa-
tion rates, but it has been an important one. These changes in age-  speciﬁ  c 
participation rates have meant that the age distribution of the labor force 
has often changed more than has the age distribution of the population. In 
particular, as the cohorts of women with higher participation rates moved 
into the younger age groups and then into older groups, the share of these 
high-  unemployment-  rate age groups in the labor force rose and then fell in 
excess of what population shares alone would dictate. This is illustrated in 
ﬁ  gure 10.12, which shows the share of sixteen-   to twenty-  four-  year-  olds 
in the population and in the labor force.
The implications for the aggregate unemployment rate have been substan-
tial. The dashed line in ﬁ  gure 10.13 reproduces the measure of the direct 
inﬂ  uence of changing population shares on the unemployment rate, while 
the solid line shows the inﬂ  uence of labor force shares, which comprises both 
changing population shares and changing participation rates. We construct 
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the latter by holding within-  group unemployment rates constant at their 
1997 levels, but allowing both the population shares and participation rates 
to change, and subtracting this counterfactual unemployment rate from 
the 1997 unemployment rate. The diﬀerence between the two lines is a mea-
sure of the inﬂ  uence of the changing participation rates. In total, changes 
in labor force shares raised the unemployment rate by 0.4 percentage point 
from 1967 to 1977—about twice as much as the change due only to changing 
population shares. Since 1977, shifts in the labor force shares have lowered 
the aggregate unemployment rate by 0.9 percentage point, 0.3 percentage 
point of which has come since 1991. Once again, the decline is bigger than 
can be accounted for by changing population shares alone, owing largely to 
the declining participation rates for young men and women.
10.4.3    Within-  Age  Unemployment  Rates
A third element in the evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate has 
been changes in within-  age unemployment rates. Figure 10.14 shows how 
unemployment rates within age group have moved over time. As one can 
see, a major development in the demographics of the labor market over the 
Fig.  10.13  Eﬀect of changing population and labor-  force shares on the aggregate 
unemployment rate (relative to 1997 actual unemployment rate)
Note: Solid line is the diﬀerence between reweighted 1997 age- sex speciﬁ  c unemployment rates 
(weights are the age-  sex speciﬁ  c labor force shares) and the aggregate unemployment in 1997. 
Dashed line is the diﬀerence between reweighted age- sex speciﬁ  c unemployment rates (weights 
are age-  sex speciﬁ  c population shares times the 1997 labor force participation rates) and the 
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past several decades has been the convergence of female and male unem-
ployment rates.
For our current purposes, we would like to know whether this convergence 
in unemployment rates reﬂ  ects one aspect of the aging of the population—
not changes in the age distribution, but the movement of particular cohorts 
through the age distribution. As we noted previously, the rise in female 
labor force participation occurred as cohorts of women with participation 
rates more similar to men’s entered the population and replaced cohorts of 
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women with less similar participation rates. By our estimates, the cohorts of 
the baby boom marked the end of decades of steadily rising cohort-  speciﬁ  c 
participation rates for women. As these cohorts moved through the age dis-
tribution, they raised the aggregate participation rate. A natural question 
is whether the convergence of female and male unemployment rates can be 
described the same way. That is, did female unemployment rates converge 
toward male unemployment rates because cohorts of women with unem-
ployment rates more similar to men’s entered the working-  age population 
and replaced cohorts of women with unemployment rates less similar to 
men’s?
In order to begin to answer this question, we estimated a model similar 
to the basic model in Fallick and Pingle (2007a). In this setup, within each 
gender, the unemployment rate of an age group in a particular year is a 
function of an age-  speciﬁ  c constant and the identity of the birth cohorts 
passing though those ages in that year, as well as cyclical controls. That is,










 Cg,b,tb  εg,t g   1 to 14,
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where g indexes the age groups, t indexes the calendar year, and b indexes 
birth years. The Cg,b,t are indicator variables that equal one if the correspond-
ing cohort b appears in that age group g at time t, and ng is the number of ages 
in age group g. Variable Xt is a vector of cyclical control variables, the  are 
age group ﬁ  xed eﬀects, and the  are birth year or cohort ﬁ  xed eﬀects. The 
degree of cyclical sensitivity () varies by age group, while the cohort eﬀects 
do not—that is, the cohort eﬀects are constrained to be the same across 
all equations in which the cohort appears. The age eﬀects () are constant.
In this setup, the shape of the age-  unemployment-  rate proﬁ  le is common 
to all persons of the same gender, but each birth cohort has a particular 
“propensity” to be unemployed that shifts the age proﬁ  le up or down.
An alternative formulation assumes that, within each gender, the unem-
ployment rate of an age group in a particular year is a function of an age- 
speciﬁ  c constant and a common eﬀect of calendar time.
(2) log  URg,t  g  gXt  t  εg,t g   1 to 14.
In this alternative, the shape of the age-  unemployment proﬁ  le is likewise 
common to all persons of the same gender, but this age proﬁ  le is shifted by 
conditions that change over time but aﬀect the unemployment rates of all 
ages proportionately.
Comparing the ﬁ  t of these two speciﬁ  cations provides an indication of 
whether the aging of speciﬁ  c cohorts can explain the evolution of the unem-
ployment rate. In the case of women, the evidence in favor of a cohort 
eﬀect in explaining the increase in labor force participation was so strong 
that we expected the evidence to favor a cohort explanation of the evolu-
tion of unemployment rates as well. In fact, as shown in ﬁ  gure 10.15, the 
estimated trend from the basic cohort speciﬁ  cation does a reasonably good 
job of capturing the low frequency movements in women’s unemployment 
rates, at least since the mid-  1970s, suggesting that the decline in women’s 
unemployment rates over that span can be usefully described in terms of 
lower-  unemployment cohorts replacing higher-  unemployment cohorts. 
However, the speciﬁ  cation that substitutes time eﬀects—modeled as a cubic 
time trend—for cohort eﬀects, does a somewhat better job of capturing the 
initial increase in female unemployment rates through the mid-  1970s.
Table 10.1 reports measures of model ﬁ  t. For women, the adjusted 
R-  squared (column [3]) for these two speciﬁ  cations are the same, when the 
model is estimated over the period 1967 to 2006. However, the adjusted 
R- squared for the full panel regression (fourteen age groups times forty time 
periods) measures the model’s ability to explain both the “between”-  group 
diﬀerences in average unemployment rates as well as the “within”-  group 
variation that is of more interest here. As a result, the adjusted R- squared 
overstates how well the model ﬁ  ts the data for any one age group.
Columns (5) and (7) report the average R-  squared (not adjusted for 
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to sixty-  four—(column [5]) and for the full complement of groups (column 
[7]). We omit the oldest age groups from these columns because the speciﬁ  -
cation with cohort dummies can “overﬁ  t” the unemployment rate for these 
groups. This is because most of the cohorts included in the sixty-  ﬁ  ve and 
older age groups are not well- represented in younger age groups in our data. 
Moreover, as shown in the last three panels of ﬁ  gure 10.14, the unemploy-
ment rates for the two oldest age groups are more idiosyncratic and less cycli-
Fig. 10.15    Estimates of trend unemployment rates: Women
Table 10.1  Measures of model ﬁ  t: Unemployment rate model
Adjusted R2
Average R2 




Model speciﬁ  cation   Men   Women  Men  Women  Men  Women
Long sample (1967–2006)  
  Cohort  dummies 0.934 0.954 0.77 0.82 0.73 0.74
  Cubic  time  trend 0.936 0.954 0.81 0.85 0.68 0.71
    Cohort dummies and cubic time trend 0.961 0.959 0.86 0.85 0.80 0.76
Short sample (1977–2006)
  Cohort  dummies 0.944 0.959 0.75 0.85 0.75 0.76
  Cubic  time  trend 0.949 0.953 0.81 0.83 0.70 0.69
    Cohort dummies and Cubic time trend  0.961   0.959   0.86   0.86   0.82   0.76
aTo construct R-  squared for individual age groups, we calculated the variances of the group-  speciﬁ  c 
unemployment rates and the group-  speciﬁ  c residuals from the regressions using all fourteen age groups. 
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cal than those for those ages sixteen to sixty-  four. The average R- squared 
for the groups between ages sixteen and sixty-  four is a little higher for the 
model with the cubic time trend, even though this model has many fewer 
explanatory variables.
As shown on the third line, adding the cohort dummies to the speciﬁ  cation 
with the cubic time trend does not improve the model’s ability to explain 
female unemployment rates for women ages sixteen to sixty-  four. Thus, we 
ﬁ  nd little evidence for a substantial role for birth-  year cohort eﬀects on 
women’s unemployment rates, in contrast to the earlier results for labor 
force participation.
For men, the results suggest a somewhat more nuanced interpretation. As 
shown in ﬁ  gure 10.16, the model with only cohort eﬀects does a poor job of 
capturing either the increase in male unemployment rates through the early 
1980s or their subsequent decline.10 In contrast, the speciﬁ  cation with the 
cubic time trend rises and falls more closely with the actual unemployment 
rate. These visual impressions are borne out by the measures of model ﬁ  t. 
As shown in column (4) of table 10.1, the average R-  squared for the eleven 
age groups aged sixteen to sixty-  four improves more notably when cohort 
eﬀects are replaced by a cubic time trend.
But, unlike the results for women, the model ﬁ  t is notably improved when 
we include both cohort eﬀects and time eﬀects. Thus, it seems that the move-
ments of relative unemployment rates for the diﬀerent age groups are more 
important for men than for women, which may in turn reﬂ  ect that age plays 
a more signiﬁ  cant role in how men have responded to aggregate labor market 
developments.
Clearly there is much more work to be done in modeling the trends in 
unemployment rates, and a discussion of the economic factors at work is 
beyond the scope of the current chapter. Nevertheless, we are conﬁ  dent that 
the aging of the population per se plays only a relatively minor role in the 
evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate at present.
10.5    Labor  Market  Flows
10.5.1    The  Age  Proﬁ  le of Unemployment Rates
The modest size of the eﬀects of population aging on the unemploy-
ment rate in recent years stems from the fact that although unemployment 
rates fall rapidly with age from the teenage years through the early thirties, 
unemployment rates are fairly stable across ages from the early thirties into 
the seventies. Some of this, no doubt, reﬂ  ects selection biases, as those types 
10. The rise and subsequent decline in the trend unemployment rate from the cohort model 
primarily reﬂ  ects the changing demographics of the labor force that we discussed previously. 
Holding labor force shares ﬁ  xed at their 1997 values, estimated trend from the cohort model is 
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of persons who would tend to have higher unemployment rates leave the 
population or the labor force at diﬀerent rates than those who tend to have 
lower unemployment rates. But the stability is nevertheless surprising given 
the profundity of the changes in labor force attachment over the life cycle. 
Indeed, the stability of the unemployment rates masks large but oﬀsetting 
changes in labor force behaviors that, taken individually, might be expected 
to signiﬁ  cantly aﬀect unemployment rates.
The most obvious of these is retirement behavior and associated with-
drawal from the labor force. Figures 10.17 and 10.18 show the average 
monthly hazard rates, by age, out of the labor force from employment and 
from unemployment, for the period 1996 to 2006, calculated from matched 
CPS data. Both rates rise rapidly beginning at ages in the ﬁ  fties, increases 
that we would associate with retirements. At least qualitatively, the changes 
in these ﬂ  ows as persons age oﬀset each other in terms of their implications 
for the unemployment rate.
However, other labor force ﬂ  ows vary over the entire range of ages over 
which unemployment rates are stable. Job ﬁ  nding rates—the hazard rates 
from unemployment to employment and from not in the labor force into 
employment—both fall over the entire range from about age thirty on (ﬁ  g-
ures 10.19 and 10.20). One would expect that because of this unemployment 
rates would rise with age, but over the same age range the rate at which new 
entrants and reentrants move from out of the labor force into unemploy-
ment falls (ﬁ  gure 10.21). Meanwhile, the ﬂ  ow that one might associate most 
directly with the unemployment rate, the hazard rate from employment to 
Fig. 10.16    Estimates of trend unemployment rates: MenFig. 10.17    Hazard rates from employment to NLF (1996–  2006)
Fig. 10.18    Hazard rates from unemployment to NLF (1996–  2006)Fig. 10.19    Hazard rates from unemployment to employment (1996–  2006)
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unemployment, remains fairly stable throughout life once past the turbulent 
younger ages (ﬁ  gure 10.22).11
10.5.2    Employment  to  Unemployment
Although the age proﬁ  les of labor force ﬂ  ows have relatively small impli-
cations for the aggregate unemployment rate, some of the particular ﬂ  ows 
are interesting in their own right. Among these is the rate of movement from 
employment to unemployment (the EU ﬂ  ow). Changes in this rate induced 
by demographic shifts may have implications for trends in prominent indi-
cators of labor market conditions, such as claims for unemployment insur-
ance, as well as for the relative importance of job separations in explaining 
movements in the unemployment rate, a topic that has attracted considerable 
attention of late (e.g., Shimer 2007; Fujita and Ramey 2009).
Fig. 10.21    Hazard rates from NLF to unemployment (1996–  2006)
11. An aging population might be expected to aﬀect the duration of unemployment in con-
tradictory ways. As the population ages away from the high turnover young years to the more 
attached prime years, durations might lengthen, while as the population ages from the more 
attached prime years to the less attached older years, durations would shorten. We have taken 
a quick look at this question by approximating the expected duration of unemployment within 
each age group by the reciprocal of the mean hazard rate for leaving unemployment (to any 
destination). By this measure, aging has little inﬂ  uence on the expected durations, especially on 
the duration of unemployment. For E and N, we are looking at top diﬀerences of 1/ 2 and 1 –  1/ 2 
months on levels of thirty- two and forty- eight months, respectively—for unemployment, a top 
diﬀerence of less than a day on levels of sixty days. However, for a more detailed analysis of the 
inﬂ  uence of the baby boomers on unemployment durations, see Abraham and Shimer (2001).404        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
As noted previously, however, the hazard rate for EU transitions is rela-
tively stable after age thirty, despite falling rapidly from the teenage years. 
Therefore, as with the unemployment rate, the direct eﬀect of aging on the 
EU rate is modest. Figure 10.23 shows the eﬀect of shifts in the age distri-
bution of the population on the EU hazard rate, relative to the rate in 1996, 
by holding constant both the within-  age EU hazard rates and the within- 
age employment-  to-  population (e/  p) ratios while letting population shares 
evolve. The mean aggregate EU hazard rate over this period is about 1.4 
percent, and the aging of the population changes the rate by only hundredths 
of a percentage point, even out as far as 2015.
Figure 10.24 puts this in terms of numbers of workers rather than rates. 
If we hold the level of payroll employment constant at its 2006 level, 
the diﬀerence in the EU ﬂ  ow from the change in the aggregate EU haz-
ard between 1996 and 2006 is on the order of 30,000 workers per month; 
between 1996 and 2015, it is 50,000 workers per month. The largest eﬀects 
of aging on the EU ﬂ  ow come not from the induced changes to the haz-
ard rate, but from the changes to the base of employment to which these 
rates can be applied. Mainly because the aggregate participation rate falls 
as the population ages, this base of employment falls. Holding the aggre-
gate population and age-  speciﬁ  c e/  p ratios constant at their 2006 levels, 
but allowing the age distribution to evolve, yields a decrease in the level of 
the aggregate EU ﬂ  ow of close to 45,000 workers per month between 1996 
and 2006, and about 125,000 per month between 1996 and 2015. Whether 
Fig. 10.22    Hazard rates from employment to unemploymentFig.  10.23  Eﬀect of aging on the EU hazard rate (relative to 1996)
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this number is small or large depends upon the context. In terms of the 
importance of EU ﬂ  ows for the unemployment rate, 125,000 is still only 
a small percentage of the overall EU ﬂ  ow. However, it implies a substan-
tial reduction in the number of weekly claims for unemployment insur-
ance that one would expect to associate with a healthy rate of economic 
growth.
10.5.3    Unemployment  vs.  Nonparticipation
A related issue is the degree to which nonparticipation replaces unem-
ployment as the alternative to employment as the population ages. Not 
only in the sense of retirement, but also as the state in which potential 
workers reside between stints of employment. Put another way, to what 
extent are movements into and out of employment mediated by a period 
of unemployment? Much of the literature that models or investigates labor 
market ﬂ  ows recognizes the importance of movements between employ-
ment and nonparticipation, and the importance of these ﬂ  ows rises as the 
population ages.
Figure 10.25 shows the percentage of transitions into employment for 
which nonparticipation, rather than unemployment, is the state of origin; 
that is, new entrants and reentrants who move into employment with-
out a period of unemployment as measured by the CPS. The ﬁ  gure also 
shows the percentage of transitions out of employment for which non-
participation, rather than unemployment, is the destination state. These 
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transitions may include retirements, discouraged workers, persons going 
back to school, leaving work to raise families, and a number of other 
categories.
As the population ages, the percentage of transitions that involve non-
participation rises, but not by much. Between 1996 and 2015, we can expect 
the shifting age distribution of the population to increase the percentage of 
transitions that involve nonparticipation by about 1 point.
10.5.4    Aggregate  Turnover
One typically thinks of older persons as being more stable in their jobs, but 
the relationship is not monotonic. Figure 10.26 shows average separation 
rates by age. These include both transitions out of employment, and tran-
sitions from one main employer to another, which can be measured using 
matched CPS data since the redesign of that survey in 1994. (See Fallick and 
Fleischman 2004.) Overall separation rates fall sharply with age into the late 
twenties, decline further gradually through the late forties, then rise into and 
through retirement ages.
As a result, the direct eﬀect of the shifting age distribution on the aggre-
gate separation rate, graphed in ﬁ  gure 10.27, is also not monotonic. Aging 
has mostly driven the aggregate separation rate down since 1996, as the 
youngest of the baby boomers entered the low-  separation ages and the old-
est of the baby boomers had not left those ages. Beginning a few years ago, 
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however, the oldest of the baby boomers began to enter the upward- sloping 
part of the separation rate proﬁ  le, and this began to push up the aggregate 
separation rate.
Again, however, the implications for the separation rate are relatively 
small, in the hundredths of a percentage point on a level of 6.8 percent per 
month. And again, the larger eﬀects come from the implications of aging 
for the level of employment, which reduces the level of aggregate turnover 
(ﬁ  gure 10.28).
10.6    Hourly  Wages
Upward sloping age- earnings proﬁ  les have long been recognized as a fea-
ture of the labor market and an inﬂ  uence on life cycle labor supply. Human 
capital theory provided an explanation for why young workers would work 
for low wages, and as skills and experience increase so too does marginal 
productivity and thus wages, as noted by Mincer (1958) and detailed by Wil-
lis (1986). Kotlikoﬀ (1988) further argued that productivity rose over the life 
cycle, but not by as much as wages. Workers were paid low wages at the start 
of their career and high wages at the end as part of contracts with employ-
ers that provided other beneﬁ  ts to both parties like retention and income 
security. Hourly wages generally rise with age, and then decline slightly in 
older age groups above sixty.
To evaluate the inﬂ  uence of the shifting age distribution on wages, we use 
the reported earnings from the outgoing rotation groups in the CPS, pro-
Fig.  10.27  Eﬀect of aging on the monthly separation rate (relative to 1996)The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    4 0 9
vided by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) CPS extrac-
tion ﬁ  le. Earnings were converted to an hourly wage, aggregated to an annual 
frequency, and deﬂ  ated by the Consumer Price Index. In cleaning the data, 
special consideration was given to trimming and removing outliers. For ex-
ample, Lemieux (chapter 1 in this volume) removes hourly wages under $1 
an hour and over $100 an hour. A common adjustment, this reduces sub-
stantially the volatility in the mean and variance of wages over time, and is 
useful for evaluations of wage inequality. However, because the variance of 
wages rises with age, such trimming will bias downwards any estimate of the 
eﬀect of aging on mean wages or the variance—there are a lot more ﬁ  fty- 
year-  old men making $100 an hour than eighteen-  year-  old men. For our 
purposes, avoiding this bias was judged a better trade-  oﬀ than a smoother 
variance series over time. Instead, because most hourly earnings outliers in 
the CPS are due to combinations of unusually low hours combined with 
unusual high wages and vice versa, we dropped hourly workers who reported 
fewer than ﬁ  ve hours of work a week but whose weekly earnings were over 
$1,000, which essentially eliminated most outliers. After that, workers 
reporting earnings less than a dollar an hour (in 2005 dollars) were also 
eliminated, which largely eliminated clumps of observations around zero, 
but otherwise had essentially no eﬀect on the results. For evaluation of such 
trimming, using exactly the same data as shown here, see Schmitt (2003), 
who notes little eﬀect on the path of mean wages once the extreme outli-
ers are removed. Thus we feel comfortable with our data cleaning, despite 
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the fact that our estimates of wage variance are more volatile than those in 
other studies.12
Figure 10.29 plots the age-  wage proﬁ  le of men in three diﬀerent years: 
1979, the earliest data for the reported wage measures in the NBER data; 
1990; and 2005, the most recent data. The proﬁ  les follow roughly the same 
pattern in each year. Although, as the authors noted earlier have suggested, 
the sheer size of the baby boomers’ cohort may have depressed their wages 
all else equal, the opposite pattern is observed in these proﬁ  les. Teen wages 
have declined since the baby boomers left those age groups and earnings of 
older workers have risen as the boomers have entered those age groups. No 
doubt the higher levels of education of the boomers are swamping other 
microeconomic eﬀects.
Not only does the mean wage vary substantially over the life cycle, but 
the variance of wages does as well. Figure 10.30 shows the age-  variance 
proﬁ  le for men in 1979, 1990, and 2005. As has been well-  established in the 
literature on wage inequality, the variance of wages has risen at almost every 
age group for men over the few decades, with a noticeable increase across 
age groups between 1979 and 1990. There has been an especially noticeable 
widening of the wage distribution among older workers, no doubt due to 
the rising return to skills and experience for some members of the oldest 
age groups. If this trend continues, as shares of the workforce begin to shift 
toward older age groups, this has the potential to put additional upward 
pressure on aggregate wage variance as the higher variance among older age 
groups interacts with the population shifts into those age groups.
Wages are determined in equilibrium as a function of supply and demand, 
and labor is a derived demand. In addition, wages are cyclical. These forces 
confound, decomposing the “pure” eﬀects of population aging on the mean 
and the variance of wages. However, as with the other measures noted ear-
lier, we attempt to estimate a ﬁ  rst-  order eﬀect by using ﬁ  xed weight alterna-
tives to observe how the shifting population shares have inﬂ  uenced the path 
of wages over time. That is, we ﬁ  x wages and the employment- to- population 
ratios to a base year (we choose 2005 in the graphs), and allow the popu-
lation shares to evolve as they have in the past and are projected to do in the 
future. Other base years yield similar conclusions.
Figure 10.31 shows the mean real hourly wage from the CPS plotted 
12. As noted before, implausibly high earnings were often the result of low reported hours 
combined with high weekly earnings, and thus hourly workers reporting fewer than ﬁ  ve hours 
of work a week combined with weekly earnings over $1,000 were dropped. Workers with 
implausibly low hourly earnings were also dropped. Earnings above the CPS topcodes were 
imputed, within each age-  sex category, using a lognormal distribution. Pareto distributions 
proved too unstable for imputation within narrowly deﬁ  ned demographic categories. For dis-
cussion of the sensitivity of the imputation and trimming procedures see Schmitt (2003), who 
convincingly argues in favor of using a lognormal distribution instead of a pareto distribution. 
Schmitt was also nice enough to provide STATA code for imputations, as well as comparable 
wage series over time for comparison. The details are described in his paper.Fig.  10.29  Age-  wage  proﬁ  les for men
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against a ﬁ  xed-  weight alternative where the employment-  to-  population 
ratios and mean wage rates within each wage-  sex group were held at their 
2005 averages. The actual real wage has risen from $16.39 an hour (in 2005 
dollars) in 1979 to $18.17 an hour in 2005. For much of the 1980s the real 
wage hovered around $16 an hour, before rising in the late 1990s, and then 
leveling oﬀ in recent years.13
The ﬁ  xed- weight alternative, where the increases in the series are due only 
to shifting population shares, rises signiﬁ  cantly as well. At face value, the 
ﬁ  xed-  weight alternative rose by $0.89 between 1979 and 2005 while actual 
real wages rose by $1.78. Thus, half the increase in real wages over the period 
is accounted for simply by the baby boomers moving into their high wage 
years. Note that with the sharp drop in actual real wages in 1979, the exact 
contribution will depend on one’s starting point. However, the shift in the 
age distribution of the population clearly contributed a substantial portion 
Fig. 10.31    Mean real wages and ﬁ  xed-  weight comparison
13. Average hourly earnings reported by the payroll survey of establishments was $16.13 in 
2005, compared to our CPS-  based series of $18.17 an hour. The payroll survey excludes non-
production and supervisory workers in addition to the self- employed, among other conceptual 
diﬀerences. The payroll survey series has a similar path as the series shown here, except for 
one diﬀerence: the payroll survey’s average hourly earnings shows more decline in real wages 
between 1979 and the early 1990s than the series we derive from the CPS. Although it reﬂ  ects 
the wages of only production and nonsupervisory workers and is based on 1982 dollars, the 
published BLS real earnings series available at http://www.bls.gov/  ces has essentially the same 
contour for mean wages over the years as the data we present here.The Effect of Population Aging on the Aggregate Labor Market    4 1 3
of the measured real wage gains in the last two decades. Looking ahead, as 
the projections in the ﬁ  gure show, this upward pressure on mean real wages 
from aging has pretty much ended, as the baby boomers have completed 
their transition into high wage age groups.
Similarly, the mere shifting of the population shares has put upward pres-
sure on wage variance. However, the amount of pressure has been small. The 
actual variance of log wages since 1979, deﬂ  ated using the CPI, is shown 
as the solid line in ﬁ  gure 10.32. The variance, although volatile, shows the 
steep upward trend since 1979 that one would expect to see given the long 
literature on wage inequality (see similar series in Schmitt [2003]). The long 
dashed line shows the change in variance due to shifting population shares, 
holding within-  group variances constant at their 2005 values and allowing 
the employment-  to-  population ratios to vary.
As is readily apparent, although shifting population shares have put 
upward pressure on wage variance, the eﬀect is small relative to the secular 
trend since the end of the 1970s. The eﬀect is small partly because under 
the surface there have been two oﬀsetting eﬀects at work. This is shown in 
ﬁ  gure 10.33. As one would expect, as the population has aged it has shifted 
toward older age groups, which have higher within-  group variances. This 
increase in within-  group variance has worked to push the overall variance 
up. However, at the same time the aging of the population has reduced the 
between- age- group variance, which has largely oﬀset the increase in average 
Fig.  10.32  Eﬀect of changing age distribution on wage variance (variance log real 
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within-  group variance. In any case, even such upward pressure as there has 
been has pretty much run its course, and we can expect little further pressure 
in the years ahead.
10.7    Conclusion
Although changes in behavior within age groups may oﬀset some of the 
inﬂ  uence of the shifting age shares, the aging of the baby boomers, increased 
longevity, and other forces inﬂ  uencing the age distribution have been and 
are likely to remain important determinants of labor market statistics. In the 
years ahead, the aggregate measure of the labor market likely to be aﬀected 
in the most pronounced way is the labor force participation rate, as the share 
of labor market participants continues to shrink in the years ahead at even a 
faster pace than over the last several years. Oﬀsetting some of the downward 
pressure, baby boomers are expected to remain in the labor force longer than 
prior cohorts. However, labor supply declines severely with age and, even 
among the baby boomers, it is unlikely that a someone born in 1950 will be 
as likely to work at age sixty-  ﬁ  ve as they were at age forty-  ﬁ  ve. Given this 
feature of labor supply over the life cycle, the shifting age distribution of the 
population is likely to put substantial downward pressure on the aggregate 
participation rate for the next thirty years.
Economists have long noted the inﬂ  uence of labor force composition on 
Fig.  10.33  Eﬀect of changing age distribution on wage variance (variance of 
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unemployment rates. In order to assess labor market slack, wage pressure, 
or the health of the labor market over time, movements in the unemploy-
ment rate must be decomposed into cyclical movements and more structural 
changes like an aging population. However, in contrast to the participation 
rate, for which large aging-  induced changes lie ahead, the inﬂ  uence of the 
aging of the baby boomers on the unemployment rate has largely run its 
course. More important to the aggregate unemployment rate of late are 
other factors, such as the decline in teenage participation that continues to 
shrink the share of a high unemployment rate age group in the labor force.
The aging population has also changed how individuals ﬂ  ow through 
the labor market states, their persistence in a given state, and the likelihood 
they drop out of the labor force entirely. Although the projected changes 
are small, we anticipate the transitions through nonparticipation will con-
tinue to rise in the years ahead. In addition, the corresponding inﬂ  uence on 
the separation rate, which fell over time and has begun to rise again, has 
been relatively modest. However small these eﬀects might be, the inﬂ  uence 
aging has on interpreting labor market statistics remains important. As we 
noted earlier, the analysis implies a substantial reduction in the number of 
weekly claims for unemployment insurance (one of the most watched high- 
frequency economic indicators) that one would expect to associate with a 
healthy rate of economic growth.
Finally, mean earnings derived from the CPS have also been inﬂ  uenced 
by population aging. The baby boomers moving into their high earnings 
years has put upward pressure on mean wages. Although this is a partial 
equilibrium accounting that does not account for such oﬀsetting inﬂ  uences 
as how the relative supply or skill supply might have oﬀset the inﬂ  uence of 
population aging, the eﬀect is still dramatic. The upward pressure that the 
baby boom has had on mean wages has largely run its course. Without that 
inﬂ  uence the gains in mean real wages in the 1990s likely would not have 
been as great. Going forward, the shifting age distribution is no longer going 
to put upward pressure on mean wages. Thus, this contribution to related 
measures like the aggregate wage bill will diminish in the years ahead.
None of the projections for population are set in stone. That said, the baby 
boom exists and baby boomers are aging. Projections of shifts in the age 
distribution of the population have wide conﬁ  dence intervals, but carrying 
forward the baby boomers from age group to age group as they pass through 
each year is not as uncertain as, say, projecting undocumented immigration. 
Life expectancy will lengthen, perhaps faster than projected (which would 
cause the aggregate labor force participation to decline even more quickly 
than projected). All in all, the population is shifting toward older age groups 
and, short of a substantial shift in policy not currently on the horizon, noth-
ing will change that feature of population growth in the United States. As 
economists continue to study economic time series, accounting for these 
shifts will remain at least as important in the future as it has in the past, if 416        Bruce Fallick, Charles Fleischman, and Jonathan Pingle
not more so. Accounting for such changes will also shed clearer light on 
pressing economic issues and problems, analysis of which might otherwise 
be confounded by the inﬂ  uence of population aging on economic measures.
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This chapter traces out the eﬀects of population aging on a few key labor 
market variables: the labor force participation rate; the unemployment rate; 
Gary Burtless is a senior fellow in economic studies and the John C. and Nancy D. Whitehead 
Chair at the Brookings Institution.